This paper investigates how the tying of complementary products can be used to both preserve and create monopoly positions, where our focus is on the use of tying to deter the entry of efficient producers. We first show how a firm that is a monopolist of a product in the current period can use tying to preserve its monopoly position in the future. We then show using related arguments how a monopolist in one market can employ tying to extend its monopoly position into a newly emerging market. The analysis focuses on the importance of entry costs and network externalities. The paper includes a discussion of antitrust implications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Tying is a common practice in many markets, i.e., the seller of product A refuses to sell A to a consumer unless the consumer also purchases B (in this scenario product A is referred to as the tying product and B as the tied product). Examples are numerous such as IBM's famous practice of requiring purchasers of IBM's tabulating machines to also purchase tabulating cards from IBM, and Microsoft's more recent attempts to bundle Internet Explorer with Windows. Due to the ongoing battles between Microsoft and the U.S. Justice Department concerning Microsoft's practices, the motivations and rationales behind tying arrangements have become the subject of both public policy and academic debates. This paper uses dynamic models to reach two major findings. First, we show how a firm that is currently a monopolist in its primary market can use tying of a complementary product to preserve its monopoly position by deterring future entry into the primary market. Second, we show how tying can be used to transfer monopoly power from the primary market to a newly emerging market. We call this dynamic motive for tying "strategic tying of complementary products." 1 Most previous analyses of tying have not focused on the ability of tying to enhance a monopolist's market power in its primary market, but instead have focused either on the ability of tying to achieve price discrimination or its ability to foreclose competition in the tied market. 2 A classic analysis in the price discrimination vein is that of metered sales. In this argument consumers vary in terms of the quantity of the tied good demanded, where high valuation consumers are assumed to have a high demand for the tied good while low valuation consumers have a low demand. The argument is that by tying and charging a high price for the tied good the monopolist is able to extract more of the surplus from the high valuation/high demand consumers. This is the standard interpretation for why IBM required consumers of its machines to also purchase cards from IBM. The foreclosure argument is quite different. One variant of this argument is that the monopolist of one product increases its profits by earning monopoly profits in the now monopolized tied market. This argument was for a long time quite controversial because many believed that the monopolist need not 1 One of the authors (Carlton) has worked for Sun Microsystems in its lawsuit against Microsoft which alleges breach of contract and antitrust violations. The opinions expressed here are those of the authors alone. monopolize the tied market to earn all the potential monopoly profits (see, e.g., Director and Levi (1956) , Bowman (1957) , Posner (1976) , and Bork (1978) ). In an important recent paper, however, Whinston (1990) has shown that criticisms of the foreclosure argument depend on the tied market being characterized by perfect competition and constant returns to scale and, given economies of scale and imperfect competition, tying can increase monopoly profitability.
In most of Whinston's analyses tying is used to induce exit in the tied market, and the subsequent lack of substitute producers in the tied market enables the firm to increase its current profits in that market. For example, suppose that a restaurant in the only hotel on a resort island competes with local restaurants. If the hotel requires its guests to eat their meals at the hotel restaurant, then there may be fewer local restaurants as a consequence of the reduced patronage. Local residents will then have fewer alternatives with the result that more of them may decide to frequent the hotel restaurant. In this case tying can be profitable because it reduces competition in the tied market. 3 In this paper we build on and extend Whinston's important work. 4 Our analysis is related to Whinston's in that we also focus on tying and foreclosure. However, we do not concentrate on the monopolist's ability to use tying and foreclosure to increase current profitability in the tied market. Rather, we use dynamic models to concentrate on the monopolist's ability to use tying and foreclosure to increase future profits by deterring entry of efficient firms into the monopolist's primary market and newly emerging markets. It is the strategic use of tying to deter the entry of efficient firms that raises the most interesting and difficult public policy issues. 5 Our first major finding is that tying can be used to preserve a monopoly position in the tying market. We begin with a two-period setting in which a firm operates in both its primary market and a market for a complementary good. In the first period the firm is a monopolist in the primary market, say 3 We thank R. Gertner for this example. 4 Other analyses related to Whinston's include Ordover, Sykes, and Willig (1985) and Choi (1996) . Neither of these papers, however, considers the ability of tying to preserve a monopoly position in the tying market or extend it to a newly emerging market which are the main focuses here. 5 Whinston does consider one setting in which tying is used to increase the firm's profits in the initially monopolized (i.e., the tying) market. In this analysis there is a competitively supplied inferior substitute for the firm's initial monopoly product, and products in this market and the potentially tied market are complementary. The result is that tying and inducing exit in the tied market can be profitable because it eliminates the competitively supplied inferior product as a substitute. In contrast, in our analysis, we show that tying can deter the entry of an efficient firm that produces superior products. due to patenting, but there is the potential for entry in the second period. The complementary good, on the other hand, can be produced both by the monopolist and another producer, where the alternative producer faces a cost of entering the complementary market. In our specification the monopolist has no incentive to tie if there is no threat of entry into the primary market, but does have such an incentive when entry into the primary market is possible. As discussed in more detail below, the logic is that tying prevents entry into the complementary market, and, in turn, because of the comple mentary nature of the products this increases monopoly profits by stopping the alternative producer from entering the primary market.
We also analyze whether our first finding regarding the monopoly preservation role for tying holds in a setting characterized by network externalities. In our analysis it is the complementary product that is characterized by network externalities, i.e., a consumer's gross benefit from the use of a firm's complementary product is positively related to the number of other consumers who use the same product.
An example of a complementary product with network externalities is an applications program, such as Word (a word processing program), where files can be traded among users. Our main result is that network externalities serve a role similar to a complementary-market entry cost, so that our first finding holds when the alternative producer faces no entry costs for the complementary good but the demand side of the market is characterized by network externalities. 6 Our second major finding is that tying can allow a monopolist to acquire a monopoly position in a newly emerging market by "swinging" or transferring his initial monopoly to the newly emerging market.
We show that each of the models described above can be extended to show this result. We first consider a variant of the entry-cost model. In this extension the newly emerging market is associated with the same complementary product as the primary market. In that case, because of the entry cost associated with the complementary product, tying primary and complementary goods lowers the profitability of a rival entering the newly emerging market in much the same way that it lowered the profitability of a rival entering the primary market in the above discussion. The conclusion is that tying primary and 6 In addition to Whinston (1990) , our first finding is related to earlier papers that consider disadvantages associated with an entrant having to simultaneously enter two markets rather than one. For example, Williamson (1979) argues that tying can reduce the probability of entry if the potential entrant only has experience relevant for producing one of the goods. His logic is that, if the potential entrant lacks experience in one of the products, then tying can inhibit entry because it forces the firm to enter both markets which given its inexperience in one of the markets results in a higher cost of capital. Another related analysis appears in Comanor (1967) which considers vertical mergers used for foreclosure rather than tying. In Comanor's argument merging deters entry by causing entry to occur in two markets simultaneously, where this is difficult because higher capital requirements serve as a barrier to entry.
complementary goods can enable the initial monopolist to monopolize the newly emerging market by lowering the other producer's return to entering that market.
The second model that illustrates our second finding is a variant of the network-externalities model described above. Here we assume that in the first period there is a primary market that is monopolized and a complementary market characterized by network externalities, while in the second period a newlyemerging-market product becomes available that serves as a superior substitute for a system composed of primary and complementary goods. We show that by tying its primary and complementary products, the initial monopolist can establish a monopoly position in the newly emerging market in the second period and thus retain its monopoly profits even after its primary product becomes obsolete. At the end of the analysis we relate this result to arguments put forth in the recent Justice Department case against Mic rosoft in which Windows and a rival's Internet browser are complementary today but in the future the browser could evolve into a substitute for Windows.
Although our various models differ in significant ways, they are all similar in terms of the mechanism through which the monopolist uses tying to deter entry into the primary market or newly emerging market. In each of our analyses the direct effect of tying is to foreclose sales of the complementary product and thereby reduce the alternative producer's return to selling that product. But there is also an indirect effect. In each of our models the alternative producer has a superior complementary product, and part (or all) of the alternative producer's return to entering the primary market or newly emerging market is an increase in the profit it derives from this superiority. The result is that, if tying is effective in stopping the alternative producer from selling the complementary product, there is also a corresponding reduction in the alternative producer's return to entering the primary market or newly emerging market. We show how this works both in models characterized by entry costs for the complementary good and network externalities.
Although much of the literature on this topic does not distinguish between the manner in which a firm ties its products, there are in fact two distinctly different ways in which tying is achieved in real-world settings. Some ties are achieved through contracting while others are achieved through product design.
For example, in the original 1936 IBM case, purchasers of IBM's tabulating machines were required to also purchase their tabulating cards from IBM --a tie achieved through contracting. In contrast, in the later 1970s case, there was an allegation that IBM's new central processing unit was interface incompatible with the plug-in components of rivals --a tie achieved through product design. Similarly, in a 1983 case, Kodak was accused of designing its camera and film so as to achieve incompatibility with rivals' products. Throughout the paper we discuss the extent to which our various theoretical models apply to each of these two types of tying arrangements. We also distinguish between the two cases in our discussion of antitrust implications because the importance of alternative efficiency rationales for tying may vary across the two types of ties.
In addition to ties achieved through contracting and product design, we also consider the possibility that a monopolist can achieve a virtual tie through pricing. For example, suppose the primary and complementary products are used in fixed proportions. Then a monopolist of the primary product can achieve a virtual tie by setting a high price on the primary product and a very low price (say zero) on the comple mentary product. This achieves a virtual tie since alternative producers of the complementary product cannot operate profitably given the very low price charged for this product by the monopolist. We discuss the situations in which a monopolist may employ virtual as opposed to real ties, and show in particular why a virtual tie may be used in settings characterized by network externalities, but not in settings characterized by entry costs for the complementary good.
Much of the attention paid to tying arrangements stems from IBM's dominance of the computer industry in the 1960s and 1970s and Microsoft's dominance of the software market in the 1980s and 1990s, and each firm's use of tying arrangements in marketing its products. Our results are that in markets characterized by numerous complementary linkages tying arrangements can be used not just to extend market power into tied markets, but also to preserve and create market power in the tying market and newly emerging markets. Thus, for example, it is possible that IBM's alleged tying of its mainframes and peripherals did not represent an ultimate goal of gaining market power in the peripherals markets, but rather tying was one of the tools the firm employed to retain market dominance in the mainframe market for so many years. Our results are particularly applicable to the IBM and Microsoft matters because it was not IBM's market power in the peripherals markets or Microsoft's market power in the applications markets that created the bulk of public polic y controversy, but rather most of the controversy stemmed from each firm's dominance of its primary market for such an extended period of time.
The outline for the paper is as follows. Section II shows that a monopolist in a primary market can sometimes use a tie with a complementary product to preserve its monopoly in the primary market.
Section III uses related arguments to show that tying can sometimes be used to extend a monopoly position into a newly emerging market. Section IV discusses antitrust implications of our analysis. Section V presents concluding remarks.
II. PRESERVING MONOPOLY THROUGH STRATEGIC TYING OF COMPLEMENTARY PRODUCTS
In this section we develop our first finding that shows how a monopolist can strategically use the tying of complementary products to preserve an initial monopoly position. We first show how this works in a setting characterized by entry costs for the complementary good, and then derive similar results when there are no entry costs for the complementary good but the market is characterized by network externalities. Our focus is on the ability of tying to make an alternative producer's future production of the complementary good less profitable, which because of complementarity deters future entry into the primary market.
A. The Model
We consider a two-period setting in which the monopolist is the sole producer in the primary market in period 1, say due to patenting, while there is the potential for entry into the primary market in period 2 by a single alternative producer. The monopolist and the primary market's alternative producer have the same constant marginal cost for producing the primary good, denoted c p . There is a complementary good that can be produced by the monopolist and a single other firm, where the monopolist and the complementary market's alternative producer have the same constant marginal cost for producing the complementary good, denoted c c . However, as described in more detail below, the alternative producer's complementary product is of higher quality than the monopolist's complementary product. 7
Also, as described in more detail below, there is a sunk cost associated with entry into each market, and firms engage in Bertrand competition when more than one firm is active.
We assume that the primary market's single alternative producer and the complementary market's single alternative producer are the same firm. Without this assumption, an entrant into the 7 The qualitative nature of the results would be unchanged if we assumed that consumers were indifferent between the monopolist's and the alternative producer's versions of the complementary good, but the alternative producer had a lower marginal cost of production for the complementary good. primary market would lose money under the model's assumptions of constant marginal costs in the primary market, positive entry costs, identical primary products, and Bertrand competition. Alternatively, we could assume two different potential entrants and allow for payments between the firms. Our choice is to assume a single potential entrant that can produce both products since this avoids the need to describe the bargaining process that would determine the size of such payments. The results that follow would be qualitatively unchanged if we assumed two different potential entrants each having the ability to produce only one product and Coasian-type bargaining.
The alternative producer has an entry or R&D cost associated with producing the first unit of the primary product, denoted E ap , while its entry cost for producing the first unit of the complementary product is denoted E ac . The monopolist has entry costs for the primary and complementary markets, although we assume these costs are sufficiently small that the monopolist always incurs both costs in the first period.
This allows us to focus on the entry decisions of the alternative producer. We denote the sum of the monopolist's entry costs as E m . Note, for both the primary and complementary markets we could include both fixed costs and entry costs, but this would not change the qualitative nature of the results.
Consumers purchase at most one unit of each good which eliminates any variable proportions rationale for tying. A primary unit can be used either by itself or in combination with a complementary unit, while a complementary unit cannot be used by itself (e.g., a computer and a printer). We refer to a primary unit and complementary unit consumed together as a system. Consumers are indifferent between a unit of the primary good produced by the monopolist and a unit produced by the alternative producer, but prefer the alternative producer's version of the complementary good (if consumers exhibited indifference among producers concerning both the primary and complementary products there would never be entry in this model). Although this is the only case we consider in our formal analyses in this section, the results easily extend to the case where consumers prefer both the alternative producer's complementary good and its primary good. We discuss this alternative specification at the end of each of our analyses.
To be precise, a consumer derives a gross benefit from a primary unit by itself equal to V′, he derives a gross benefit from a system in which the complementary good is produced by the monopolist equal to V, while his gross benefit from a system in which the complementary good is produced by the alternative producer is V+∆, where V-V′>c c and V′-c p >∆/2. The restriction V-V′>c c ensures that the monopolist would sell complementary units if there was no alternative producer. The restriction V′-c p > ∆ /2, as we will show, ensures that the primary market monopoly is more valuable to the monopolist than the potential benefits associated with having the alternative producer offer its higher quality complementary product. We assume there are two cohorts of N identical consumers. Consumers in cohort 1 are in the market in period 1 while consumers in cohort 2 are in the market in period 2 (to simplify the analysis, consumers in cohort 1 are assumed not to be in the market in period 2 even if they do not purchase anything in period 1). We assume there is no discounting by both the firms and consumers, although incorporating discounting would not materially change the results.
In the beginning of the first period the monopolist decides whether to offer a tied product consisting of one unit of its primary and complementary goods or whether to offer the products individually. 8 We assume this decision is binding for both periods 1 and 2, but the results would be very similar if we instead assumed that the monopolist's product choices for period 2 were decided at the beginning of period 2 (see footnote 13 for a discussion). Following Whinston, we also assume that if the two goods are tied, a consumer cannot undo the tie. That is, if a consumer purchases a tied good consisting of one unit of the monopolist's primary good and one unit of its complementary good, then the consumer cannot purchase a unit of the complementary good from the alternative producer and create a system consisting of the monopolist's primary good and the alternative producer's complementary good.
This means that if the monopolist offers only a tied product, then in the first period the alternative producer will not be able to sell any units of the complementary good. In contrast, in the second period the alternative producer would not be locked out of the market because it can produce both products. 9 In the first period, if the monopolist decides to offer its primary and complementary goods as individual products, then the alternative producer must decide whether or not to enter the complementary market. If the alternative producer enters, then prices are determined by Bertrand competition. In the second period, the alternative producer decides whether or not to enter the primary market and, if it did not enter the complementary market previously, whether or not to enter the complementary market. Since in 8 There is no reason for a firm to offer both tied and individual products in this model because consumers are identical rather than heterogeneous. See Adams and Yellen (1976) for an analysis in which consumers are heterogeneous and firms sometimes offer both tied and individual products to more effectively price discriminate. 9 There are two possibilities for how the analysis of Subsection II.B would change if we were instead to assume that consumers can undo ties. If c c ≥∆ then all the results that follow would be completely unchanged, while for smaller values for c c allowing consumers to undo ties would reduce the range of parameterizations for which the monopolist would use tying to deter entry into the primary market. See footnote 21 for a discussion of how the analysis in Subsection II.C is affected by allowing consumers to undo ties. this model there is no incentive for the alternative producer to tie, to simplify the exposition we assume that when the alternative producer is in both markets in the second period it offers individual products. As in the first period, if both firms are active in the second period then prices are determined by Bertrand competition. Finally, we restrict attention to Pure-Strategy Subgame-Perfect Nash equilibria.
One interpretation of our assumption that in the first period the alternative producer decides to enter the complementary market after the monopolist's tying decision is that our first analysis concerns ties achieved through product design. Think of the alternative producer's complementary market entry cost as that part of the product design or R&D cost that can only be incurred after the alternative producer observes the design of the monopolist's primary product, and assume that tying means the monopolist designs its primary and complementary products so that they are a single physical unit. 10 Since the alternative producer decides whether to incur the complementary market entry cost only after it sees the design of the monopolist's primary product, we have that the entry decision occurs after the monopolist's tying decision. As discussed in more detail later, the second analysis in this section applies equally well to ties achieved through product design as to ties achieved through contracting.
In this model, Bertrand competition sometimes does not result in a unique set of prices. To see this, suppose the monopolist produces independent products and the alternative producer has entered the complementary market in period 1. One equilibrium set of prices in period 1 is that the monopolist charges V-c c for its primary product and the alternative producer charges ∆+c c for its complementary product (here and in the following set of equilibrium prices, consumers purchase the complementary good from the alternative producer as long as the monopolist charges more than c c for its complementary product). In this equilibrium the alternative producer receives all the surplus associated with consumers preferring its version of the complementary product. However, another set of equilibrium prices is the monopolist charges V+∆-c c for its primary product and the alternative producer charges c c for its complementary product. In this equilibrium the monopolist receives all the surplus associated with consumers preferring the alternative producer's version of the complementary good. In fact, any division across the two sellers is consistent with equilibrium.
In our analysis we assume that, if the alternative producer has only entered the complementary market, then the prices that emerge divide evenly across the two sellers the surplus associated with consumers preferring the alternative producer's version of the complementary good. 11 The same qualitative results would follow from any division that gave each firm a strictly positive proportion of the surplus, but the results would not follow if the surplus was either all received by the monopolist or all received by the alternative producer. In the former case tying would not decrease the alternative producer's return to entering the complementary market in the first period (since the alternative producer would earn zero rents from such entry whether or not the monopolist ties), and as a result tying would not affect the alternative producer's primary-market entry decision in the second period. In the latter case, if the monopolist offered individual products and the alternative producer were to enter the primary market in the second period after entering the complementary market in the first, there would be no increase in the proportion of the surplus received by the alternative producer. The result is that even if the monopolist did not tie the alternative producer would never enter the primary market.
B. Analysis
As a result of our assumption that it faces low entry costs, the monopolist enters both markets in the first period. Our focus is on the entry decisions of the alternative producer, and the extent to which the monopolist tries to affect these decisions by offering a tied product. Our main result is that the monopolist will sometimes use tying to deter entry by the alternative producer into both the primary and complementary markets. This strategy increases the monopolist's profitability by preserving its monopoly in the primary market in the second period.
We begin with a benchmark analysis in which the alternative producer cannot enter the primary market in either the first or second periods (a simple interpretation is that E ap =∞). In this benchmark analysis, however, there is still the possibility that the monopolist will use tying to deter entry into the complementary market, although we will show that the monopolist does not have an incentive to deter entry in this case. Our argument in this benchmark case is closely related to Whinston's first analysis of tying and complementary goods. In that analysis Whinston considers a setting in which, as in our model, all uses of the complementary good require the primary good, and shows that the monopolist has no 11 One interpretation of our assumption that the surplus is divided equally between the firms is that prices are determined by the Nash bargaining solution (see Nash (1950) ).
incentive to tie because the monopolist is actually helped when the alternative producer enters the complementary market.
Suppose the alternative producer can never enter the primary market. In that case the monopolist can deter the alternative producer from ever entering the complementary market by offering a tied product. Proposition 1 answers three questions. First, under which circumstances does the alternative producer enter and under which does it stay out? Second, when entry does occur, in which period does it take place? Third, is the monopolist better off or worse off when the alternative producer stays out of the complementary market? Proofs are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1: Suppose E ap =∞. Then there exists a value E ac ′, E ac ′>0, such that every equilibrium is characterized by i) and ii) if E ac >E ac ′, while iii) and iv) characterize equilibrium behavior if E ac <E ac ′. Also, overall monopoly profitability is higher when E ac <E ac ′.
i) The monopolist offers individual or tied products.
ii) The alternative producer never enters the complementary market.
iii) The monopolist offers individual products.
iv) The alternative producer enters the complementary market in the first period.
There are three results of interest in Proposition 1. First, the alternative producer enters the complementary market if its entry cost is small, and does not enter if its entry cost is large. Second, when entry occurs the alternative producer enters in the first period. This result is not surprising, since there is a bigger return to entering when entry allows the firm to operate in the market for two periods rather than one. Third, the monopolist earns higher profits when entry occurs than when it does not. The logic here is that, since the monopolist is able to capture some of the surplus associated with consumers preferring the alternative producer's complementary product, the monopolist's profitability rises upon entry.
The last result above tells us that in this model, if there is no threat of entry into the primary market, then the monopolist has no incentive to deter entry into the complementary market. Thus, although in this case offering a tied product is an optimal strategy for the monopolist when E ac >E ac ′ (but not the only optimal strategy), this is not because the monopolist wants to deter entry. Rather, the cause and effect are in the other direction. Because the alternative producer's entry cost is sufficiently high that no entry will take place, there is no cost (and no return) to the monopolist from offering a tied product.
We now consider what happens when the alternative producer has the option of entering the primary market in the second period. This case works quite differently than the benchmark case analyzed above. The reason is that, as opposed to what is true when the alternative producer enters only the complementary market, when it enters both the primary and complementary markets overall monopoly profitability is hurt rather than helped. As a result, the monopolist sometimes deters entry into both markets by offering a tied product. We begin with a preliminary result concerning the alternative producer's incentive to enter the primary market in the second period. Below, π a2 pc denotes the alternative producer's second-period profitability when the alternative producer enters the complementary market in period 1 and the primary market in period 2, and π a2 c denotes the alternative producer's secondperiod profitability when the alternative producer enters the complementary market in period 1 and does not enter the primary market in period 2 (and the monopolist offers independent products). Lemma 1 is straightforward. It simply says that, if the monopolist offers individual products and the alternative producer enters the complementary market in the first period, then the alternative producer will stay out of the primary market in the second period if the cost of entering that market is sufficiently high. But it will enter if the cost of entry is sufficiently low. The next step is to consider in more detail what happens if the alternative producer has entered both markets by the beginning of the second period.
Below, π m denotes overall monopoly profitability, π mj denotes monopoly profitability in period j, π a denotes the overall profitability of the alternative producer, and π aj denotes the alternative producer's profitability in period j.
Suppose the alternative producer has entered both markets by the beginning of the second period.
Bertrand competition yields that purchasing a system from the monopolist will cost c p +c c , purchasing a system from the alternative producer will cost c p +c c +∆, and consumers purchase the complementary product from the alternative producer (sales of the primary product may be split across the two firms). 12
In turn, second-period monopoly profitability is given by π m2 =0, while π a2 =N∆-E ap if the alternative producer had entered the complementary market in period 1 but π a2 =N∆-E ap -E ac if it had not. There are two results of interest here. First, as opposed to what was true when the alternative producer entered only the complementary market, second-period monopoly profitability is now below rather than above second-period profitability in the absence of any entry. Second, the alternative producer's second-period profitability depends on whether it had entered the complementary market in the first period. If it had not, then the alternative producer bears that entry cost in the second period with a resulting decrease in second-period profitability.
The above analysis suggests that the monopolist sometimes has an incentive to deter entry into the complementary market in the first period, where this arises not from the effect on first-period profitability but rather because of the effect on second-period and overall profitability. That is, the benchmark analysis tells us that deterring entry into the complementary market in the first period reduces the monopolist's first-period profitability. However, this action reduces the alternative producer's return to operating in the primary and complementary markets in the second period, with the possible result that entry into both markets is deterred in which case second-period and overall monopoly profitability are increased.
Proposition 2 shows that this argument sometimes results in the monopolist offering a tied product.
Proposition 2: If E ap <E ap *, then there exist values E ac * and E ac **, 0<E ac *<E ac **, such that for all E ac *<E ac <E ac ** the unique equilibrium is characterized by i) and ii).
i) The monopolist offers a tied product.
ii) The alternative producer never enters either market.
Proposition 2 says that, if the alternative producer would enter the primary market in the second period given the monopolist offers individual products and the alternative producer had previously entered the complementary market (E ap <E ap *), then the monopolist sometimes offers a tied product and in this way deters entry into both markets. In particular, the monopolist does this when the alternative producer's cost of entering the complementary market falls in an intermediate range. The logic is that if this entry cost is low (E ac <E ac *) the monopolist has no incentive to tie because the alternative producer would respond by entering both markets in the second period, while if this cost is high (E ac >E ac **) there is no incentive (or disincentive) for the monopolist to tie because the alternative producer would never enter either market even if the monopolist offered individual products. However, for intermediate values the alternative producer would enter both markets if the monopolist offered individual products, but never enters either market if the monopolist ties. 13 The essential feature of our argument concerns the relationship between the surplus associated with the alternative producer's superior complementary product and the alternative producer's return to entering the primary market in the second period. Suppose the monopolist sells individual products and the alternative producer enters the complementary market in the first period. Because of Bertrand competition and that the two firms produce identical primary products, the sole return to the alternative producer for entering the primary market in the second period is that, instead of splitting the surplus associated with its superior complementary product, the alternative producer receives all of the surplus due to that superiority. As a result, if by tying the monopolist is able to stop entry into the complementary market, then it also stops entry into the primary market by eliminating the alternative producer's return to entering that market.
One interesting question is, when the monopolist has an incentive to tie, what is the effect on social welfare from a prohibition on tying? The answer is that when the monopolist has an incentive to tie a prohibition on tying increases social welfare. The logic for this result is as follows. A prohibition on tying would result in the alternative producer entering the complementary market in the first period and the primary market in the second period, which from a social welfare standpoint creates two countervailing effects. First, consumers would have access to the alternative producer's superior complementary product which increases social welfare by the amount 2N∆. Second, the alternative producer incurs the entry costs E ap and E ac which decreases social welfare by the amount E ap +E ac . In the Appendix it is 13 In our model the monopolist decides at the beginning of the first period whether to offer a tied product consisting of one unit of its primary and complementary goods or whether to offer the products individually, and this decision is binding for both periods 1 and 2. A natural question is, what happens if the monopolist's product choices for period 2 are decided at the beginning of period 2? The answer is that, if E ap <E ap * and E ac *<E ac <E ac **, then the monopolist would still have an incentive to deter entry into both markets. However, this would now mean tying in the first period and offering either a tied product or individual products in the second period.
shown that if E ap <E ap * and E ac <E ac **, then E ap +E ac <2N∆. Thus, when the monopolist has an incentive to tie, social welfare is inceased by its prohibition.
As a final point, suppose that consumers preferred both the alternative producer's complementary product and the alternative producer's primary product. All the major results of the analysis would still hold. 14 That is, since part of the alternative producer's return to entering the primary market would still be an increase in the surplus it derives from its superior complementary product (as indicated above, when consumers are indifferent between the two primary products this is the whole return), by tying and deterring entry into the complementary market the monopolist would still reduce the alternative producer's return to entering the primary market. The result is that there would again be parameterizations in which the monopolist uses tying to deter entry into both markets. The only difference is that in this case, rather than these parameterizations consisting of a low range of values for E ap and an intermediate range for E ac , tying may be associated with E ap and E ac both being in intermediate ranges. The reason is that, if E ap is very small and consumers prefer the alternative producer's primary product by a large amount, the alternative producer will enter the primary market independent of whether it enters the complementary market. 15
C. Network Externalities 14 Suppose consumers preferred both the alternative producer's complementary product and the monopolist's primary product. Then all the major results of the analysis would still hold as long as the consumers did not prefer the monopolist's primary product by too much. We have also worked out an example in which the alternative producer has a superior primary product but an inferior complementary product, and shown that the monopolist will again sometimes use tying to preserve its initial monopoly position in the primary market. However, although the conclusion that tying can be used to preserve an initial monopoly position is the same as in the model investigated above, the logic behind the conclusion is quite different. In this example consumers would optimally like to combine the alternative producer's superior primary product with the monopolist's superior complementary product. If the monopolist ties then consumers are not able to combine products in this way, and the result is that the alternative producer's return to entering the primary market is reduced. In turn, if this return is reduced enough, then tying stops the alternative producer from entering the primary market.
15 Although we have not formally shown the result, we also believe we can relax the Bertrand competition assumption without changing the qualitative nature of our findings. That is, suppose the setting was not characterized by Bertrand competition, but the strategic interaction between the firms was such that the alternative producer derived more of the surplus associated with its superior complementary product when it was in both markets rather than just the comp lementary market. Then tying and deterring entry into the complementary market could still be the monopolist's optimal strategy because it would still reduce the alternative producer's return to entering the primary market.
The previous subsection demonstrated a monopoly preservation role for tying when the alternative producer faces entry costs for the complementary good. In this subsection we assume away entry costs for the complementary good, and show that the presence of network externalities for the complementary good can similarly result in the strategic use of tying to deter entry into the primary market. As we will show, one interesting aspect of the network externalities case is that the tie can take the form of a virtual tie achieved through pricing as was discussed in the Introduction. 16 In addition to assuming no entry costs for the complementary good, we make the following changes to the model analyzed previously. Let N mj be the number of consumers in cohort j who own a system consisting of one unit of the primary good and one unit of the monopolist's complementary good, while N aj is the number of consumers in cohort j who own a system consisting of one unit of the primary good and one unit of the alternative producer's complementary good. A consumer derives a gross benefit from a system in which the complementary good is produced by the monopolist equal to V+v(N m1 +N m2 ), v′>0, while a consumer derives a gross benefit from a system in which the complementary good is produced by the alternative producer equal to V+∆+v(N a1 +N a2 ). In this specification, v(.) embodies network externalities, i.e., the gross benefit a consumer derives from a system is positively related to the number of other consumers with a similar system. 17 As mentioned earlier, one example of a complementary good with network externalities is an applications program, such as Word, where files can be traded among users.
In each of periods 1 and 2, because of network externalities, a given set of prices will frequently not result in a unique set of purchase decisions by the consumers. Similar to the approach taken in Katz and Shapiro (1986) , we assume that purchase decisions are made as if consumers could coordinate behavior. That is, when there are multiple equilibria for a subgame that starts with consumer purchase decisions, we rule out the equilibria that are Pareto dominated for the consumers purchasing that period. 16 Papers on the network externalities issue include Shapiro (1986,1994) and Saloner (1986,1992) . 17 In this specification each consumer derives equal benefit from consumers in the same cohort who purchase a similar system as from consumers in the other cohort. Allowing for differential benefits would complicate the analysis without changing the qualitative nature of the results. Relatedly, we could allow each consumer to derive a positive but small benefit from consumers who purchase a system that contains the "other" complementary good. For example, a consumer could derive a gross benefit from a system in which the complementary good is produced by the monopolist equal to V+v(N m1 +N m2 +β(N a1 +N a2 )), while he could derive a gross benefit from a system in which the complementary good is produced by the alternative producer equal to V+∆+v(N a1 +N a2 +β(N m1 +N m2 )), where β<1. This change would also not affect the qualitative nature of the results.
Another way to put this is that we restrict attention to Perfectly Coalition-Proof Nash equilibria (see Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987) for a discussion of this refinement). Additionally, as in the previous subsection, in this model Bertrand competition will sometimes not result in a unique set of prices. If this occurs in period 2, we assume similar to previously that the prices that emerge evenly split across the two sellers the surplus associated with consumers preferring the alternative producer's version of the complementary good, although as before any split that gave each firm a strictly positive proportion of the surplus would yield the same qualitative results. 18 Another change is that we now assume V′-c p > 2∆
rather than the assumption of the previous subsection that V′-c p >∆/2. 19 There are two points to note regarding the model. First, an important difference between this model and the previous one is that here the size of the second-period surplus associated with consumers preferring the alternative producer's complementary good depends on first-period consumption decisions.
That is, due to network externalities, this surplus is larger if cohort 1 consumers purchased the alternative producer's complementary product and smaller if they purchased the monopolist's complementary product. Second, we continue to assume as previously that in the first period the monopolist chooses whether to tie prior to prices being chosen. However, the results of the analysis would be unchanged if we instead assumed that in the first period the monopolist's product choices are made at the same time prices are chosen. This means that the analysis here applies equally well to ties achieved through product design where it is most natural to assume that tying occurs prior to pricing, as to ties achieved through contracting where it is most natural to assume that tying and pricing decisions are made simultaneously. 18 In the previous subsection, if the alternative producer entered the complementary market in the first period, firstperiod consumption decisions did not affect the size of the surplus in the second period. As a result, in that subsection the assumption that surplus is divided equally across the two sellers has a well defined meaning for both the first-period pricing game and the second-period pricing game. In contrast, as discussed above, in this subsection first-period consumption decisions affect the size of the surplus in the second period. As a result, in this subsection the assumption that the surplus is divided equally across the two sellers has a well defined meaning for the secondperiod pricing game but not for the first-period pricing game. Given this problem, we only impose the assumption for the second-period pricing game. 19 The reason the condition is more restrictive in this subsection than in the previous subsection is because, when Bertrand competition does not result in a unique set of prices in the first period, we do not impose any assumption concerning how this multiple equilibria problem is resolved (see footnote 18). As a result, it is possible the monopolist gets all the surplus associated with cohort 1 consumers and cohort 2 consumers preferring the alternative producer's version of the complementary good, and this means V′-c p >2∆ is needed to ensure that the primary-market monopoly is more valuable to the monopolist than the potential benefits associated with having the alternative producer sell its superior complementary product.
We first consider what happens if the alternative producer enters the primary market in period 2, where we initially focus on parameterizations characterized by v(2N)-v(N)>∆ since the argument is simpler for these parameterizations. 20 There are two cases. The first case is that consumers purchased complementary units from the alternative producer in period 1. In this case Bertrand competition yields that purchasing a system from the monopolist will cost c p +c c , purchasing a system from the alternative producer will cost c p +c c +∆+v ( suggest that the monopolist will sometimes deter entry into the primary market in period 2 by behaving in a manner that causes cohort 1 consumers to purchase complementary units from the monopolist. We formalize this argument in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3: If v(2N)-v(N)>∆/2, then there exist values E ap * and E ap **, 0≤E ap *<E ap **, such that for all E ap *<E ap <E ap ** every equilibrium is characterized by i) and ii).
i) There is no entry into the primary market in the second period, and consumers in both cohorts purchase both primary and comple mentary goods from the monopolist.
ii) The monopolist offers a tied product, or offers individual products but in the first period charges a "high" price for the primary product and a "low" price for the complementary product (see the proof for the exact definitions of "high" and "low").
Proposition 3 tells us that the monopolist will sometimes use either a real tie or a virtual tie achieved through pricing to both stop the alternative producer from selling complementary units and deter its entry into the primary market. The logic for the case v(2N)-v(N)>∆ was discussed above. When the monopolist sells its products in a manner that causes cohort 1 consumers to purchase complementary units from the monopolist, the alternative producer loses money in the second period if it enters the primary market. The result is that the alternative producer does not enter the primary market in the second period and this in turn increases overall monopoly profitability. The restriction on E ap captures that, for this logic to result in a reason for the monopolis to tie, E ap must be sufficiently small that the alternative producer producer's return to entering the primary market is positively related to the surplus associated with its complementary units, the alternative producer's return to entering the primary market is also lower if cohort 1 consumers purchased complementary units from the monopolist. The result is that, as in the other case, by selling its products in a manner that causes cohort 1 consumers to purchase complementary units from the monopolist, the monopolist can sometimes make primary-market entry unprofitable which in turn increases overall monopoly profitability. Also similar to the other case, the restriction on E ap captures that, for this logic to result in a reason for for the monopolist to tie, E ap must be in a range such that the alternative producer would enter the primary market in period 2 if the alternative producer sold complementary units to all cohort 1 consumers, but would not enter if the monopolist sold complementary units to all cohort 1 consumers.
An interesting aspect of Proposition 3 is that the monopolist need not actually tie its products to achieve its goal, but can rather employ a virtual tie achieved through first-period prices. The logic is that, if the complementary good in the first period is priced sufficiently low, then the alternative producer cannot profitably sell complementary units. 21 A natural question that arises is, why is a virtual tie achieved through pricing an entry deterring strategy in the network-externalities case but not in the entry-cost case?
The reason is the different goals the monopolist is trying to achieve through tying in the two cases. In the network-externalities case, the goal of the monopolist in tying is to force cohort 1 consumers to purchase the complementary good from the monopolist because this is what stops entry into the primary market in the second period. This can be achieved either by using a real tie in which case cohort 1 consumers are directly forced to purchase the complementary good from the monopolist, or by a virtual tie where cohort 1 consumers purchase the complementary good from the monopolist because its price is set so low.
Now consider the entry-cost analysis. In that analysis, the goal of the monopolist in tying is to stop the alternative producer from entering the complementary market in the first period because in that case this is what stops entry into the primary market in the second period. This can be achieved by a real tie because the alternative producer will not enter the complementary market in the first period if it knows it cannot sell any complementary units in the first period. However, a virtual tie achieved through pricing will not work. The reason is that, once the alternative producer has entered the complementary market in the first period, the monopolist's incentive is not to employ a virtual tie but rather price in such a fashion that the alternative producer sells complementary units. In other words, attempting to deter entry using a virtual tie is not a credible or time-consistent strategy in the entry-cost case. 21 In our analysis we do not allow the monopolist to charge a negative price for its complementary good. As a result, a virtual tie achieved through first-period pricing is not always feasible. See the proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix for details. Note, a related point is that whenever a virtual tie achieved through first-period pricing is feasible, then all of our results are unchanged if we assume that consumers can undo real ties. The reason is that, if consumers can undo real ties, then a real tie is like setting the price on the complementary good equal to zero and is thus equivalent to a virtual tie.
As was true in the previous subsection, the essential feature of our argument concerns the relationship between the surplus associated with the alternative producer's superior complementary product and the alternative producer's return to entering the primary market in the second period.
Suppose the monopolist sells individual products and the alternative producer sells complementary units to all cohort 1 consumers. Similar to what was true before, the sole return to the alternative producer for entering the primary market in the second period is that, instead of splitting the surplus associated with its superior complementary product, the alternative producer receives all of this surplus. Given this, now suppose the monopolist ties. Because of network externalities, when the monopolist ties and cohort 1 consumers purchase complementary units from the monopolist, the result is a reduction or elimination of the potential surplus associated with the alternative producer's superior complementary product. In turn, this translates into a reduction or elimination of the incremental surplus the monopolist can capture by entering the primary market. Hence, tying can be optimal for the monopolist because it stops entry into the primary market by reducing its return.
As in Subsection II.B one could ask whether from a social welfare standpoint there is a return to prohibiting tying where in this case that means prohibiting both real ties and virtual ties achieved through first-period pricing. 22 In the analysis of Proposition 3 the answer is ambiguous. That is, for some of the parameterizations in which the monopolist has an incentive to tie prohibiting tying increases social welfare, but for others it decreases it. The logic for this result is as follows. A prohibition on tying would result in the alternative producer selling complementary units to all cohort 1 consumers and entering the primary market in the second period, which, as earlier, from a social welfare standpoint creates two countervailing effects. First, consumers would have access to the alternative producer's superior complementary product which increases social welfare by the amount 2N∆. Second, the alternative producer incurs the entry cost E ap which decreases social welfare by the amount E ap . In turn, since E ap *<2N∆<E ap ** (see the Appendix), we have that for some of the parameterizations in which the monopolist has an incentive to tie social welfare is increased by its prohibition while for others it is decreased.
On an intuitive level, this simply says that from a social welfare standpoint the alternative producer's return to entering the primary market can be excessive. The reason is the presence of 22 Prohibiting real ties but not virtual ties achieved through first-period pricing would have no real effect when virtual ties are feasible, and would be equivalent to prohibiting both when virtual ties are not feasible. See footnote 21for a discussion of the feasibility of virtual ties. network externalities. If the monopolist does not tie and the alternative producer sells complementary units to all cohort 1 consumers in the first period, part of the alternative producer's return to entering the primary market in the second period is capturing more of that part of the second-period surplus due to network externalities and the alternative producer's first-period sales of complementary units. But that part of the second-period surplus does not represent a net increase in social welfare due to the alternative producer selling complementary units. The result is that the alternative producer's return to entering the primary market can exceed the increase in social welfare associated with the alternative producer's superior complementary product, which in turn means that if the monopolist ties and stops the alternative producer from selling both products social welfare can actually increase.
Finally, as in the previous subsection, the results of this analysis extend to the case where consumers prefer both the alternative producer's comple mentary good and its primary good. 23 The reason is that, since part of the alternative producer's return to entering the primary market would still be capturing more of the surplus associated with its superior complementary product, by tying and stopping the alternative producer from selling complementary units in the first period the monopolist would still reduce the alternative producer's return to entering the primary market in the second period. The only difference between this case and the case analyzed is that, as in the previous subsection, allowing the alternative producer to have a superior primary product changes the set of parameterizations for which the monopolist uses tying to deter entry.
III. EXTENDING MONOPOLY THROUGH STRATEGIC TYING OF COMPLEMENTARY PRODUCTS
In Section II we showed how a monopolist can strategically use the tying of complementary products to preserve an initial monopoly position. In this section using two extensions of the models analyzed in the previous section, we develop our second major finding that shows how a monopolist can strategically use the tying of complementary products to extend a monopoly position into a newly emerging market. We first consider a model closely related to that analyzed in Subsection II.B, and discuss how tying can be used by the monopolist to "swing" or transfer his monopoly to the newly emerging market in a setting in which the newly emerging market is associated with the same complementary good as the monopolist's primary market. We then consider a model closely related to that analyzed in Subsection II.C, and discuss how tying allows the monopolist to monopolize the newly emerging market in a setting in which the newly-emerging-market product is superior to a system consisting of primary and complementary units. 24
A. The Newly-Emerging-Market Product Uses the Same Complementary Good
Starting from the model analyzed in Subsection II.B (where there was a monopolist of a primary product in period 1, and a single alternative producer that could enter the complementary market in period 1 and the primary market in period 2), we make the following changes. First, the monopolist now faces no threat of entry into its primary market, and thus tying is not needed to deter entry into that market.
Second, there is now a newly emerging market that is associated with the same complementary good as the primary market (although see footnote 26). The newly emerging market does not exist in the first period, but both the monopolist and the alternative producer can enter this market at the beginning of the second period at a cost E n . Third, similar to what is true for primary units, a newly-emerging-market or simply new-market unit can either be used by itself or in combination with a complementary unit. Also, again similar to what is true for primary units, consumers are indifferent between a new-market unit produced by the monopolist and a new-market unit produced by the alternative producer, but prefer the alternative producer's complementary good for their new-market systems.
To be precise, a consumer derives a gross benefit from a new-market unit by itsel equal to V n ′, he derives a gross benefit from a new-market system in which the complementary unit is produced by the monopolist equal to V n , while his gross benefit from a new-market system in which the complementary unit is produced by the alternative producer is equal to V n +∆ n , where V n -V n ′>c c and N(V n ′-c n )-E n >N∆.
The restriction V n -V n ′>c c ensures that the monopolist would sell complementary units for use in newmarket systems if there was no alternative producer. The restriction N(V n ′-c n )-E n >N∆ ensures that being the sole producer of the new-market good in the second period is more valuable to the monopolist than the potential benefits associated with consumers being able to purchase the alternative producer's superior complementary product for use in primary-market systems. 25 24 A more detailed description and analysis of each extension appears in Carlton and Waldman (1999) .
In this model, if the alternative producer could never enter the newly emerging market, the monopolist would have no incentive to deter entry into the complementary market by tying. The reason is that, given the alternative producer can never enter the newly emerging market, the monopolist earns higher profits when the alternative producer enters the complementary market. The logic is the same as for the analogous result in Subsection II.B (the monopolist has no incentive to deter entry into the complementary market by tying if the alternative producer can never enter the primary market). That is, since the monopolist is able to capture some of the surplus associated with consumers preferring the alternative producer's complementary product, the monopolist's profitability rises when the alternative producer enters the complementary market.
We now consider what happens when the alternative producer has the option of entering the newly emerging market in the second period. Our focus is on how the monopolist can use tying of primary and complementary goods in period 1 to deter the alternative producer from ever entering the complementary market, and in this way establish a monopoly position in the newly emerging market in period 2. 26 The first result is that, if E n is sufficiently small, then monopolization of the newly emerging market by one firm or the other is quite likely. Specifically, if the alternative producer enters the complementary market in the first period, then the alternative producer monopolizes the newly emerging market in the second period. In contrast, if the alternative producer is deterred from ever entering the complementary market, then the monopolist is the sole producer in the newly emerging market in the second period.
To see the logic for this result suppose the alternative producer enters the complementary market in the first period and the entry cost for the newly emerging market is very small. In this case, because the alternative producer has a superior complementary product, the alternative producer will enter the newly emerging market in period 2 whether or not it expects the monopolist to enter (if the alternative producer expects the monopolist to enter, then the alternative producer also enters because entry allows the alternative producer to capture more of the surplus associated with its superior complementary product). In contrast, because of Bertrand competition and that the monopolist has an inferior complementary product, the monopolist will not enter the newly emerging market in period 2 if it expects the alternative producer to enter. In other words, if the alternative producer entered the complementary market in the first period and the entry cost for the newly emerging market is sufficiently small, then only the alternative producer enters the newly emerging market in the second period. A similar logic explains why, if the alternative producer never enters the complementary market and the entry cost for the newly emerging market is sufficiently small, then only the monopolist enters the newly emerging market in the second period.
Our second result which builds on the first concerns the monopolist's choice of whether or not to tie its primary and complementary products. In particular, if the entry cost for the newly emerging market is sufficiently small, then the monopolist sometimes ties its primary and complementary goods because this allows the firm to extend its monopoly position into the newly emerging market. 27 The logic here is as follows. If the monopolist offers individual products and as a result the alternative producer enters the complementary market in the first period, then from above we know the alternative producer monopolizes the newly emerging market in the second period. But suppose the monopolist ties. Then the alternative producer has no incentive to enter the complementary market in the first period. Further, the alternative producer's return for being active in the complementary market in the second period is lower for two reasons. First, if it is active in the complementary market in the second period, it now bears the complementary market entry cost in that period. Second, it cannot sell any complementary units in the second period for use in primary-market systems. If these costs are sufficiently large, then the alternative 27 To be precise, similar to what was true in Proposition 2 in Subsection II.B, the monopolist ties in order to monopolize the newly emerging market in the second period when the alternative producer's cost of entering the complementary market falls in an intermediate range. The logic is that if this entry cost is low the monopolist does not tie because the alternative producer would respond by entering the newly emerging and complementary markets in the second period, while if the cost is high the alternative producer would never enter either market even if the monopolist did not tie. However, if the alternative producer's entry cost for the complementary market is in an intermediate range, then the alternative producer enters neither market if the monopolist ties but enters both markets if the monopolist does not tie.
producer will never enter the complementary market. In turn, if this is the case , then the monopolist has an incentive to tie because from above we know the monopolist will monopolize the newly emerging market if the alternative producer never enters the complementary market.
It should be clear that the argument of this subsection is closely related to that of Subsection II.B.
In Subsection II.B the monopolist tied its primary and complementary goods and in this way reduced the alternative producer's second-period return from being active in the primary and complementary markets.
The result was that the alternative producer never entered either the primary or complementary market and the monopolist preserved its monopoly position in the primary market in the second period. Here, the monopolist ties its primary and complementary goods and in this way reduces the alternative producer's second-period return from being active in the newly emerging and complementary markets. The result is that the alternative producer never enters either the newly emerging or complementary market and the monopolist establishes a monopoly position in the newly emerging market in the second period.
One interesting difference between the argument presented here and the argument of Subsection II.B is that here the social welfare implications are ambiguous. That is, social welfare is increased by a prohibition on tying for some of the parameterizations in which the monopolist ties, but for other such parameterizations social welfare is decreased by a prohibition on tying. To see this note that as in the earlier analysis there are two countervailing effects associated with a prohibition on tying. One effect is that consumers would have access to the alternative producer's superior complementary product which increases social welfare by the amount 2N∆+N∆ n . The other effect is that the alternative producer incurs the entry cost E ac which decreases social welfare by the amount E ac . Analysis of the model shows that there are parameterizations in which the monopolist ties and E ac >2N∆+N∆ n , while for other parameterizations the monopolist ties and E ac <2N∆+N∆ n .
The logic behind this result is similar to the logic for the similar result in Subsection II.C, i.e., in each case the result stems from a socially excessive return to entry. In the above analysis, if the monopolist offers individual products and the alternative producer enters the complementary market in the first period, then the alternative producer monopolizes the newly emerging market in the second period.
That is, part of the alternative producer's return to entering the complementary market in the first period is the return to monopolizing the newly emerging market in the second period. But since this part of the return does not represent a net increase in social welfare, the alternative producer would sometimes enter the complementary market in the first period even when the entry cost is so high that entry reduces social welfare. In such a case prohibiting tying decreases social welfare because it results in inefficient entry.
B. The Newly-Emerging-Market Product is Superior to a Primary-Complementary-Good System
In this subsection we explore a second avenue through which linkages between a primary market and a newly emerging market allow a monopolist to extend its monopoly position to the newly emerging market. In particular, we consider a variant of the model analyzed in Subsection II.C involving network externalities, and show how our analysis applies when a newly-emerging-market product that is also subject to network externalities is superior to a system consisting of primary and complementary goods.
That is, the newly-emerging-market product performs all the functions of a system consisting of primary and complementary goods but has a lower marginal cost of production. At the end of the subsection we relate our analysis to arguments put forth in the recent Justice Department case against Microsoft.
We make the following three changes to the model analyzed in Subsection II.C. First, as in the previous subsection, the monopolist now faces no threat of entry into its primary market, and thus tying is not needed to deter entry into that market. Second, our focus here is on parameterizations characterized by strong network externalities, i.e., v(2N)-v(N)>∆. Third, in the second period there is a newly emerging market whose product is superior to a system consisting of primary and complementary goods. In order to make precise what it means to say that the newly-emerging-market product is superior to a system consisting of primary and complementary goods, we introduce the idea of consumption activities. That is, consumers now derive a gross benefit from the performance of each of two activities --a primary-market activity and a complementary-market activity.
Consider first cohort 1 consumers. For these consumers a primary unit can be used only to perform the primary-market activity, while a complementary unit can be used only to perform the complementary-market activity. Further, the specification for the gross benefits that cohort 1 consumers derive from the various goods is exactly the same as in Subsection II.C. One should now think of V′ as the gross benefit that a cohort 1 consumer derives from using the monopolist's primary good to perform the primary-market activity. Additionally, V-V′+v(N m1 +N m2 ) is the gross benefit a cohort 1 consumer derives if he uses the monopolist's complementary good to perform the complementary-market activity, while V-V′+∆+v(N a1 +N a2 ) is the gross benefit he derives if he uses the alternative producer's complementary good to perform the complementary-market activity.
For cohort 2 consumers the situation is different because at the beginning of period 2 each firm can invest E n and acquire the ability to produce a new-market product. If a firm does not invest, then in the second period it can produce the same good or goods that it could produce in the first period. In contrast, if a firm does invest, then in the second period it can produce new-market units at constant marginal cost c n , c n <c p +c c , where a new-market unit can be used to perform both the primary-market activity and the complementary-market activity. To be precise, cohort 2 consumers derive gross benefits for the various goods as follows. A cohort 2 consumer who purchases only primary and complementary goods derives gross benefits exactly the same as cohort 1 consumers. A cohort 2 consumer who purchases a new-market unit produced by the monopolist derives a gross benefit equal to V+v(N m1 +N m2 ), while a cohort 2 consumer who purchases a new-market unit produced by the alternative producer derives a gross benefit equal to V+∆+v(N a1 +N a2 ). Note, in these expressions and the ones above, N m2 includes both cohort 2 consumers who purchase a new-market good from the monopolist as well as cohort 2 consumers who purchase a system consisting of one unit of the primary good and one unit of the monopolist's complementary good. N a2 is defined analogously. 28
Our focus is on values for E n sufficiently small that at least one firm always invests in equilibrium.
Since new-market products can be used to perform both primary-market and complementary-market activities, that at least one firm always invests means the primary and complementary goods become obsolete in the second period. 29 What happens is that, despite the fact the monopolist's primary good becomes obsolete in the second period, the monopolist is sometimes able to retain the monopoly profits associated with its primary good. That is, the monopolist can sometimes use tying of its primary and complementary goods in period 1 to monopolize the newly emerging market in period 2 and in this way retain its monopoly profits even after technological progress makes its primary good obsolete. We begin by considering the manner in which second-period investment decisions depend on first-period consumption decisions. 28 As was true in Subsection II.C, results here are independent of whether the monopolist chooses first-period prices after deciding whether or not to tie or whether the decisions are made simultaneously. Hence, also as was true in Subsection II.C, the analysis that follows applies equally well to ties achieved through product design as to ties achieved through contracting. 29 Previous papers that have studied the obsolescence issue include Levinthal and Purohit (1989) , Waldman (1993 Waldman ( , 1996 , and Choi (1994) .
Our first result is similar to the first result in the previous subsection. That is, if E n is sufficiently small, then in the second period one firm or the other is likely to monopolize the newly emerging market.
By this we mean the following. First, if all cohort 1 consumers purchase the monopolist's complementary product, then in the second period only the monopolist invests in the new-market technology and all cohort 2 consumers purchase only the monopolist's new-market product. Second, if all cohort 1 consumers purchase the alternative producer's complementary product, then in the second period only the alternative producer invests in the new-market technology and all cohort 2 consumers purchase only the alternative producer's new-market product.
The logic behind this result is similar to that for the similar result in the previous subsection.
Because cohort 2 consumers prefer new-market products produced by the first-period seller of complementary units (this follows from v(2N)-v(N)>∆), if E n is sufficiently small, then this first-period seller invests in period 2 whether or not it expects the other firm to invest. Further, because of Bertrand competition and that a new-market product produced by the first-period seller of complementary units will be more attractive to cohort 2 consumers than the other firm's new-market product, the other firm will not invest if it expects the first-period seller of complementary units to invest. The result is that, if E n is sufficiently small, then only the first-period seller of complementary units invests in the second period.
Our second result is similar to the second result in the previous subsection. If E n is sufficiently small, then in the first period the monopolist ties in order to stop the alternative producer from selling complementary units, where the return to this behavior is that the firm establishes a monopoly position in the newly emerging market in the second period. In contrast to what was true in the previous subsection, however, we find that as in Subsection II.C the tie now can take the form either of a real tie or of a virtual tie achieved through pricing. As in Subsection II.C, by a virtual tie achieved through pricing we mean the monopolist offers individual products but charges a sufficiently low price for the complementary good that the alternative producer chooses not to sell complementary units.
The logic for why the monopolist has an incentive to tie in this setting is closely related to the first result described above. If the alternative producer sells complementary units in the first period, then from above we know the alternative producer monopolizes the newly emerging market in the second period and not surprisingly this results in a decrease in overall monopoly profitability. To stop this from occurring, in the first period the monopolist uses either a real tie or a virtual tie achieved through pricing to ensure that cohort 1 consumers purchase complementary units from the monopolist. From above we know this increases monopoly profitability because forcing cohort 1 consumers to purchase complementary units from the monopolist results in the firm monopolizing the newly emerging market in the second period.
As in Subsection II.C, one could ask whether from a social welfare standpoint there is a return to prohibiting tying where this means prohibiting both real ties and virtual ties achieved through first-period pricing. The answer is that, for the parameterizations in which the monopolist has an incentive to tie a prohibition on tying unambiguously increases social welfare. The logic is straightforward. If the monopolist ties then cohort 1 consumers purchase the monopolist's complementary product, only the monopolist invests in the second period, and in terms of the complementary-market activity both cohorts of consumers forgo ∆. In contrast, if the monopolist does not tie then cohort 1 consumers purchase the alternative producer's complementary product, only the alternative producer invests in the second period, and in terms of the complementary-market activity both cohorts of consumers receive ∆. Since from a social welfare standpoint the only difference between the cases is that both cohorts of consumers forgo ∆ when the monopolist ties, social welfare is unambiguously increased by a prohibition on tying.
The results captured here are related to the current antitrust case against Microsoft. One of the Justice Department's main allegations is that Microsoft has attempted to monopolize the Internet browser market through tying and a variety of other practices, and that its goal is to preserve its monopoly position in the operating systems market. 30 The Department argues that a successful rival Internet browser could potentially evolve into a substitute for Windows. It then argues that tying will allow Microsoft to monopolize the Internet browser market, and monopolizing that market will allow Microsoft to preserve its monopoly position in the operating systems market. Our analysis is closely related. In particular, if one interprets our model's new-market second-period good as simply a next generation complementary good, then our analysis captures the Justice Department's argument. Under this interpretation, due to technological progress the monopolist's primary product becomes obsolete in the second period because next generation complementary units serve as a superior substitute for the monopolist's primary product.
However, because tying in the first period allows the monopolist to extend its monopoly position to the complementary good, the monopolist is able to retain its monopoly profits even after technological progress causes the firm's initial monopoly product to become obsolete.
Regarding Microsoft's behavior concerning Windows and Internet Explorer, another interesting aspect of the analysis in this subsection is that the tie can take the form of a virtual tie achieved through first-period pricing. Microsoft's initial behavior concerning Windows95 and Internet Explorer was to bundle the two products and forbid computer manufacturers from removing Internet Explorer from the bundle. Early in 1998 in the middle of the Justice Department's contempt proceedings related to that bundle, Microsoft removed the restriction on manufacturers with respect to Windows95 (later versions of Windows do not have an option to remove Internet Explorer). During this time period Internet Explorer was free for purchasers of Windows95, and the result was that Microsoft's share of the internet browser market continued to grow even after manufacturers were allowed to remove Internet Explorer from the bundle. These events are consistent with the results here and in Subsection II.C that, in industries characterized by network externalities, real ties and virtual ties achieved through pricing can be close substitutes in forcing consumers to purchase the complementary good from the primary-market monopolist.
IV. ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS
This paper has shown how a monopolist can engage in strategic tying over time in order to both preserve and extend its monopoly. Such strategic behavior is akin to various types of pre-positioning and pre-commitment behavior, well examined in the economic literature. It would be a grievous mistake to condemn such strategic behavior and attempt to use the antitrust laws to prevent it without an analysis of the welfare consequences of such behavior and without an analysis of the likelihood of being able to correctly identify such behavior without simultaneously condemning welfare enhancing behavior. Too often in the past, antitrust advocates have confused the theoretical possibility of harm with an empirical demonstration of such a harm. In this subsection, we attempt to evaluate the antitrust implications of our theory and contrast those implications with the standard antitrust doctrine regarding tie -ins.
The primary focus in the antitrust laws on tying has been the foreclosure of competition in the tied product. It was this focus that the Chicago School labeled misguided because in the litigated cases (e.g.,
International Salt, IBM), the tie facilitated price discrimination and had no effect on competition in the tied product. It is well known that the welfare effects of price discrimination are ambiguous --in general, to the extent that tying allows a firm to come closer to practicing perfect price discrimination, the more likely is welfare enhanced. Hence, there is no intellectual basis to justify traditional antitrust hostility toward tieins when such tie -ins are used for reasons of price discrimination. Whinston's (1990) work shows that, absent free entry and constant returns to scale in the tied product, tying can adversely affect competition in the tied product. This provides a possible justification for the traditional antitrust doctrine opposed to tie -in sales based on market foreclosure of the tied product.
We have extended Whinston's work to show how tying can be used to both preserve and extend the monopoly in the tying market, where in the context of our theoretical analyses this behavior frequently results in an unambiguous decrease in social welfare. 31 This approach addresses and explains what appears to be an important phenomenon in industries where technology is constantly being improved, such as in computing. Therefore, a key insight of our paper is to cease to view tying as a special category of offence that forecloses competition in the tied product (see Hyde) and more as strategic behavior akin to exclusive dealing that permits the preservation and extension of monopoly. 32 We now address some difficulties in trying to turn the theoretical possibility of harm shown here and in Whinston's analysis into a prescriptive theory for antitrust enforcement.
One legal issue in a tie -in case is whether it is proper to regard a tie between two products as simply a bundle consisting of tying and tied products. The mere fact that product A and product B could be separately defined, produced, and consumed does not answer the question. Since the production of A and B into a combination product C (a package with the characteristics of A and B) can have properties that A and B separately do not have (e.g., convenience of use, added functionality), a difficult issue is evaluating the motivation for product C. Specifically, do the consumer benefits of C justify its introduction or is its introduction solely to allow the firm to engage in strategic tying? This, to us, is, in general, a horrendously complex trade-off to evaluate. Fear of antitrust scrutiny could easily prevent an innovator from introducing new desirable products. The flip side, of course, is that failure for antitrust enforcers to act can sometimes turn an industry from competition to monopoly.
Our views on evaluating this complex trade-off are as follows. First, great weight should be given to any plausible efficiency from the tie. Efficiencies may be hard to quantify, but foregoing an efficiency can generate substantial deadweight loss. Second, evidence on motivation can sometimes assist in exceptional cases in figuring out the reason for the tie and could provide a justification for intervention.
For example, evidence that the sole purpose of a design change was to stymie competitors by creating an effective tie could be the type of evidence that allows one to avoid analyzing the technological benefits of the design change --a task which we predict will fail to lead to consensus. This type of evidence (such as memos) is of the kind usually examined by lawyers not economists. Third, efficiencies achieved through physical integration (as when A and B are produced together in a package C) should receive greater weight than efficiencies achieved through contract (in which the combined use of A and B are mandated by contract). The antitrust laws have always shown greater reluctance to interfere in activities within the firm compared to interfering in activities outside of the firm. For example, an antitrust court is much more apt to negate an exclusive dealing contract with distributors than it is to order divestiture of an internal division engaged in marketing. The logic, and in general it sounds correct, is that the cost of interfering inside a firm (where many unspecified relationships and transactions are not mediated by the price system) is likely to be higher than interfering in the contractual relations between two firms. Of course, any preference shown for in-firm activities will create an incentive for a firm to organize more activities within the firm.
Our analysis showed that, in the presence of network externalities, a virtual tie can sometimes be effectively created by setting the price of the complementary good sufficiently low. Since a virtual tie is similar to a contractual tie in that the firm has shown by its actions that there is no efficiency reason to physically produce the components as one, the antitrust analysis should proceed under a rule of reason, as is standard in exclusionary contractual disputes such as those involving exclusive dealing. However, the virtual tie raises the issue of whether a claim of predation makes sense. Creating a virtual tie through pricing may require a price below marginal production cost, but especially in a market characterized by network effects, there could be an efficiency justification for such pricing. What is interesting and novel about this pricing is that, if it is used strategically to deter entry, the recoupment does not occur in the complementary market but in the primary market. This means that ease of entry into the primary market, not the complementary market, is key and that the failure to observe an elevation of price in the complementary market cannot be regarded as definitive proof against predation or strategic behavior.
A particularly vexsome issue --and one wholly ignored by antitrust courts --is whether raising the rate of return is desirable in industries undergoing rapid technological change. The argument would be that strategic behavior that entrenches monopoly raises the return to being the first in the industry. By raising this return, more innovation is encouraged. If, as empirical studies appear to show (e.g., Mansfield et al. (1977) , Bernstein and Nadiri (1988) , Mansfield (1991) , and Jones and Williams (1998) ) the social rate of return from innovation exceeds the private rate of return, such an action would be desirable. However, despite its logic, we have never seen an antitrust court use the importance of innovation as a decision criteria for whether to allow monopolization.
In real-world settings where tying is an issue, the welfare consequences of encouraging more
innovation are even harder to analyze than in a simple model of a single patent race. The reason is that although at early stages of industry evolution strategic behavior could raise the rate of return and thereby encourage more innovation, the consequence of strategic behavior could be to dampen the incentives for subsequent innovations. Especially in a growing market, the value of the subsequent innovations could easily swamp the value of the initial ones.
In summary, the difficulty of using cost-benefit analyses to identify harmful tie -ins leads us to the conclusion that, other than in exceptional cases, plausible efficiency justifications for a physical tie should defeat an antitrust attack on tying. For contractual ties and virtual ties achieved through pricing, the standard can be lower and a balancing of competitive harms versus benefits can be done much as is now done in exclusive-dealing cases. However, in performing such a balancing, courts should demand much more than mere theoretical possibility before they give weight to competitive harms from strategic behavior.
V. CONCLUSION
Most previous analyses of tying have focused either on the ability of tying to achieve price discrimination or its ability to foreclose competition in the tied market. In contrast, our focus is on the use of tying to preserve and extend a monopoly position in the tying market, where we concentrate on the use of tying to deter the entry of efficient producers. In particular, we present a series of analyses in which a firm that is currently a monopolist in its primary market uses tying of a complementary product to deter future entry into either the primary market or a newly emerging market. Depending on the model, the result is that the monopolist is able to either preserve its monopoly or transfer it to a newly emerging market. In each of our analyses when the monopolist ties there is a direct reduction in the alternative producer's return to selling the complementary product. In turn, because of the complementary links between the products, if the alternative producer is deterred from selling the complementary product there is also a corresponding reduction in the alternative producer's return to entering the primary market or newly emerging market. We show how this can work both in models characterized by entry costs and in models characterized by network externalities.
Our analysis suggests that the use of tying to preserve and extend a monopoly position will be most important in industries characterized by substantial innovation where product lifetimes are short.
Consider, for example, the analysis of Subsection II.B. In that analysis the direct result of tying is that the alternative producer cannot sell any complementary units in the first period which lowers the alternative producer's return to being active in the primary and complementary markets in the second period. Since in that analysis the lifetime of the complementary product is two periods, eliminating one period of sales has a significant effect on this return. Suppose instead product lifetimes were very long and tying only foreclosed sales of the complementary product for one or at most a few periods. In that case tying still reduces the alternative producer's return to eventually being active in the primary and complementary markets, but because only a small fraction of potential sales are eliminated, tying has only a small effect on this return. In other words, it is in markets with substantial innovation where product lifetimes are short that tying should be most effective in preserving and extending an initial monopoly position.
There are many directions in which our analysis could be extended. Two specific directions come to mind. First, it might be of interest to analyze a setting in which the monopolist can control the speed of innovation. Our conjecture is that, in such a setting, a primary-market monopolist would sometimes preserve and extend its monopoly by both introducing new products quickly and tying each new generation of its primary and complementary products. The logic is that, consistent with the above discussion, tying is likely to be a more effective tool in markets in which product lifetimes are short. Second, it might be of interest to explore the extent to which our arguments apply to merger activity. Our conjecture is that many of our arguments apply to a monopolist of a primary product merging with a complementary good producer with significant market power. The logic is that such a merger will help the monopolist preserve its monopoly by eliminating a potential rival who has a strong incentive to enter the primary market.
APPENDIX
Due to space considerations, proofs are somewhat abbreviated.
Proof of Proposition 1: Given E ap =∞, the alternative producer will never enter the primary market. Given this, suppose for the moment that the monopolist offers individual products. There are three possibilities. We consider the case in which the monopolist offers independent products, but the profitabilities for the two firms are the same if the monopolist offers a tied product. For the primary product, Bertrand competition yields that each firm charges a price equal to c p , and sales are split between the two firms.
For the complementary product, Bertrand competition yields that the monopolist charges c c , the alternative producer charges c c +∆, and cohort 2 consumers purchase complementary units from the alternative producer. 33 Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose the monopolist offers a tied product. There are four possibilities. First, the alternative producer never enters either market in which case π m =2N[V-c p -c c ]-E m and π a =0. Second, the alternative producer enters the complementary market in either period 1 or period 2 and never enters the primary market. Because the monopolist is only offering a tied product, the alternative producer would be unable to sell any complementary units if it only entered the complementary market and thus in this case π a =-E ac . Third, the alternative producer enters the primary market in period 2 and never enters the complementary market. Because the monopolist is offering a tied product, the alternative producer would be unable to sell any primary units in period 2 if it only entered the primary market and thus in this case π a =-E ap . Fourth, the alternative producer enters the primary market in period 2 and enters the complementary market in either period 1 or period 2. Because the monopolist is offering a tied product, the alternative producer would be unable to sell any complementary units in the first period whether or not it enters the complementary market in the first period. In the second period, Bertrand competition yields that the monopolist charges c p +c c for its system, the alternative producer charges an aggregate price of Now consider period 1. Suppose the monopolist ties in period 1. If all cohort 1 consumers purchase complementary units from the monopolist, then from above we know that in period 2 all cohort 2 consumers will also purchase complementary units from the monopolist. Let P s denote the price the monopolist charges for a system. Given that a cohort 1 consumer's net benefit from purchasing a system from the monopolist equals V+v(N m1 +N m2 )-P s , for any P s that satisfies P s ≤V+v(2N), each cohort 1 consumer's utility is maximized by having every cohort 1 consumer purchase a system (if P s =V+v(2N), then each cohort 1 consumer is indifferent between having all purchase and not purchasing). Similarly, for any P s that satisfies P s >V+v(2N), each cohort 1 consumer's utility is maximized by not purchasing.
Hence, since purchase decisions are made as if consumers could coordinate behavior and since if all cohort 1 consumers purchase the resulting second-period profit is independent of the first-period price, the monopolist sets P s =V+v (2N) . 34 Suppose the monopolist offers individual products in period 1. Let P p denote the monopolist's price for its primary product, P c denote the monopolist's price for its complementary product, and P ac denote the alternative producer's price for its complementary product. A cohort 1 consumer's net benefit from purchasing a system consisting of one unit of the monopolist's primary product and one unit of the alternative producer's complementary product is V+∆+v(N a1 +N a2 )-P p -P ac . This means that, if the alternative producer is to sell any complementary units in period 1, the alternative producer's price for complementary units must satisfy P ac ≤V+∆+v (2N) If the monopolist offers individual products in period 1, there are three possibilities. First, the alternative producer sells complementary units to some but not all cohort 1 consumers in the first period.
There are two cases. First, the alternative producer does not enter the primary market in the second period. Consider a cohort 1 consumer who purchased the alternative producer's complementary product.
This consumer's first-period utility is given by V+∆+v(N a1 +N a2 )-P p -P ac ≥V+v(N m1 +N m2 )-P p -P c (if this inequality did not hold, the consumer could have increased his utility by purchasing the monopolist's complementary product). 35 But if this condition holds, then all cohort 1 consumers purchasing the alternative producer's complementary product is also equilibrium behavior, and under this alternative set of purchase strategies this consumer's first-period utility is given by V+∆+v(2N)-P p -P ac >V+∆+v(N a1 +N a2 )-P p -P ac . Given our assumption that purchase decisions are made as if consumers could coordinate behavior, we have just shown that it cannot be the case that some but not all cohort 1 consumers purchase complementary units from the alternative producer in the first period and the alternative producer does not enter the primary market in the second period. Second, the alternative producer enters the primary market 34 Because price is a continuous variable, for any P s strictly below V+v(2N), there is a higher value for P s that increases the monopolist's overall profit. This means that, if the monopolist ties, the unique equilibrium to the subsequent subgame is characterized by P s =V+v(2N).
in the second period. This case is ruled out using an argument similar to that used to rule out the first case.
Second then P c =V+v(2N)-P p yields P c <0 which is not a feasible strategy. If the monopolist sets P p <P* and P c =V+v(2N)-P p , then the alternative producer's best response is to set P ac in such a fashion that cohort 1 consumers purchase complementary units from the alternative producer. Hence, if P*>V+v(2N), then the monopolist cannot achieve π m =2N[V+v(2N)-c p -c c ]-E m . Second, suppose P*≤V+v(2N). If the monopolist sets P p >V+v(2N), then P c =V+v(2N)-P p yields P c <0 which is not a feasible strategy. If the monopolist sets P p <P* and P c =V+v(2N)-P p , then the alternative producer's best response is again to set P ac in such a fashion that cohort 1 consumers purchase complementary units from the alternative producer. However, suppose the monopolist sets P*≤P p ≤V+v(2N) and P c =V+v(2N)-P p . Then P c ≥0 and the alternative producer's best response is to price in such a way that the alternative producer sells no complementary units in the first period (if P p =P*, then the alternative producer is indifferent between pricing in this fashion and pricing such that it sells complementary units to all cohort 1 consumers in the first period). In other words, if P*≤V+v(2N), then there are multiple price pairs for which overall monopoly profit is the same as with tying.
In summary, there are two parameter regimes. If P*>V+v(2N), then there is a unique equilibrium in which the monopolist offers a tied product, the alternative producer does not enter the primary market in the second period, and consumers in both cohorts purchase both primary and complementary goods from the monopolist. If P*≤V+v(2N), then there are multiple equilibria. One equilibrium is the same as when P*>V+v(2N). The other equilibria are identical to the tying equilibrium, except that in the first period the monopolist sells individual products and charges a high price for the primary product and a low price for the complementary product.
